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Abstract
Black-Scholes (BS) is the standard mathematical model for European option pricing in
financial markets. Option prices are calculated using an analytical formula whose main inputs
are strike (at which price to exercise) and volatility. The BS framework assumes that volatility
remains constant across all strikes, however, in practice it varies. How do traders come to learn
these parameters?
We introduce natural models of learning agents, in which they update their beliefs about
the true implied volatility based on the opinions of other traders. We prove exponentially fast
convergence of these opinion dynamics using techniques from control theory and leader-follower
models, thus providing a resolution between theory and market practices. We allow for two
different models, one with feedback and one with an unknown leader.
1 Introduction
Derivative contracts are actively traded across the world’s financial markets with a total estimate
worth in the trillions of dollars. To get an intuitive understanding of the setting and the issues at
hand let’s consider the prototypical example of European options.
A European option is the right to buy or sell an underlying asset at some point in the future
at a fixed price, also known as the strike. A call option gives the right to buy an asset and a put
option gives the right to sell an asset at the agreed price. On the opposite side of the buyer is the
seller who has relinquished his control of exercise. Buyers of puts and calls can exercise the right
to buy or sell. Sellers of options have to fulfill obligations when exercised against. The payoff of a
buyer of a call option with stock price ST at expiry time T and exercise price K is max{ST −K, 0},
whereas for a put option is max{K − ST , 0}.
To get a price we input the current stock price S0 (e.g. $101), the exercise price K (e.g. $90),
the expiry T (e.g. three months from today) and the volatility σ in the Black-Scholes (BS) formula
and out comes the answer, the quoted price of the instrument [5].
Price = BS(S0,K, T, σ).
Volatility, which captures the beliefs about how turbulent the stock price will be, is left up to
the market. This parameter is so important that in practice the market trades European calls and
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Figure 1: (a) A typical implied volatility smile for varying strikes K divided by fixed spot price.
Moneyness is K/S0. ATM denotes at-the-money where K equals S0, (b) Consensus occurs as all
investors’ opinions of the implied volatility converge, round by round, to a distinct value for varying
strikes.
puts by quoting volatilities.1 How does the market decide about what the quoted volatility should
be (e.g. for a stock index in 3 months from now) is a critical, but not well understood, question.
This is exactly what we aim to study by introducing models of learning agents who update their
beliefs about the volatility.
Our contribution. We introduce two different classes of learning models that converge to a
consensus. The first introduces a feedback mechanism (Section 3.1, Theorem 3.1) where agents who
are off the true “hidden” volatility parameter feel a slight (even infinitesimally so) pull towards it
along with the all the other “random” chatter of the market. This model captures the setting where
traders have access to an alternative trading venue or an information source provided by brokers
and private message boards. The second model incorporates a market leader (e.g. Goldman Sachs)
that is confident in its own internal metrics or is privy to client flow (private information) and
does not give any weight to outside opinions (Section 3.2,Theorem 3.3). Proving the convergence
results (as well as establishing the exponentially fast convergence rates) requires tools from discrete
dynamical systems. We showcase as well as complement our theoretical results with experiments
(e.g. Figures 2.a-2.d), which for example show that if we move away from our models convergence is
no longer guaranteed.
Options can be struck at different strike prices on the same asset (e.g. K = $90, $75, $60). If
the underlying asset and the time to exercise T (e.g. 3 months) are the same, one would expect
the volatility to be the same at different strikes. In practice, however, the market after the 1987
crash has evolved to exhibit different volatilities. This rather strange phenomenon is referred to
as the smile, or smirk (see figure 1). Depending on the market, these smirks can be more or less
pronounced. For instance, equity markets display a strong skew or smirk. A symmetric smile is
more common in foreign exchange options markets. An excellent introduction to volatility smiles is
given in [8].
We formalize the multi-dimensional analogues of our two models above using Kronecker products
(Section 4, Theorems 4.1 and 4.3). Thus our models show how a volatility curve could function
as a global attractor given adaptive agents. We conclude the paper by discussing future work on
identifying necessary structural conditions on the shape of arbitrage free volatility curves.
1Using the Black-Scholes formula with particular implied volatility, traders obtain a dollar value price.
2
2 Model description
In mathematical opinion dynamic models agents take views of other agents into account before
arriving at their own updated estimate. Agents can observe other agents’ previous signals.
Degroot [6] was one of the early developers of such observational learning dynamics. While
simple, these models allow us to examine convergence to consensus. In a sense these type of models
are called naive models, as agents can recall perfectly what the other players submitted in the
previous round.
2.1 Volatility Basics
Investors have an initial opinion of the implied volatility, which subsequently gets updated after
taking into account volatilities of other agents. A feedback mechanism aids the agents in arriving at
the true volatility parameter.
At all times the focus is on a static picture of the volatility smile. Within this static framework
agents are updating their opinion of the true implied volatility. This updating occurs in a high-
frequency sense. In an exchange setting, one can think of all bids and offers as visible to agents. The
agents initially are unsure of the true value of the implied volatility, but by learning - and feedback -
get to the true parameter. Our first attempt is a naive learning model common in social networks.
Learning occurs between trading times. Thus our implicit assumption is that no transactions occur
while traders are adjusting and learning each others quotes.
This rather peculiar feature is market practice. Trading happens at longer intervals than quote
updating. This is as true for high frequency trading of stocks as it is for options markets. Quotes
and prices - or rather vols - are changing more frequently than actual transactions.
Each dollar value of an option corresponds to an implied volatility parameter σ(K,T ) ∈ (0, 1)
that depends on strike and expiry. Implied volatility is quoted in percentage terms.
Assumption 2.1. We have three types of players: agents/traders, brokers and leaders. Brokers
give feedback to the traders. The ability of agents to determine this feedback is their learning ability.
Leaders are unknown and don’t give feedback but their quotes are visible.
Each agent takes a weighted average of the all the agents’ estimates of volatility at a particular
strike and expiry.
2.2 Naive Opinion Dynamics
A first approach towards opinion dynamics is to assume each agent takes a weighted average of
other agents’ opinions and updates his own estimate of the volatility parameter for the next period,
i.e., at time t, the opinion xit ∈ R of the i-th agent is given by
xit =
n∑
j=1
aijx
j
t−1, t ∈ N, (1)
where xjt−1 ∈ R is the opinion of agent j at time (t− 1) and aij ≥ 0 denotes the opinion weights for
the n investors with
∑n
j=1 aij = 1 and aii > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Define Xt := (x1t , . . . , xnt )>; then,
the opinion dynamics of the n agents can be written in matrix form as follows
Xt = AXt−1, (2)
where A := aij ∈ Rn×n is a row-stochastic matrix.
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Definition 2.2 (consensus). The n agents (2) are said to reach consensus if for any initial
condition X1 ∈ Rn, |xit − xjt | → 0 as t→∞ for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . n}.
Definition 2.3 (consensus to a point). The n agents (2) are said to reach consensus to a point
if for any initial condition X1 ∈ Rn, limt→∞Xt = c1n, where 1n denotes the n× 1 vector composed
of only ones and c ∈ R. The constant c is often referred to as the consensus value.
For the opinion dynamics (2), we introduce the following result by [6] (see also [14] for definitions).
Proposition 2.4. Consider the opinion dynamics in equation (2). If A is aperiodic and irreducible,
then for any initial condition X1 ∈ Rn consensus to a point is reached. The consensus value c
depends on both the matrix A and the initial condition X1.
Remark 2.5. Proposition 2.4 implies that if the row stochastic opinion matrix A is aperiodic and
irreducible; then all the agents converge to some consensus value c. However, since c depends on the
unknown initial opinion X1, the consensus value c is unknown and, in general, different from the
true volatility σ(K,T ). We wish to alleviate this and thus introduce two novel models.
3 Consensus (scalar agent dynamics)
In this section, we assume that the agents are able to learn how far off they are from the true
volatility by informational channels in the marketplace. There are many avenues, platforms and
private online chat rooms that provide quotes for option prices; some of these are stale and some
are fresh. The agents’ learning ability determines the quality of the feedback from all these sources.
We aggregate all of this information in the form of a feedback controller. If they are fast learners,
they adjust their volatility estimates quickly.
3.1 Consensus with Feedback
We model this feedback by introducing an extra driving term into the opinion dynamics (1). In
particular, we feedback the difference between the agents’ opinion and the true volatility σ(K,T )
scaled by a learning coefficient i ∈ (0, 1). We assume that σ(K,T ) is invariant, i.e., for some fixed
σ¯ ∈ (0, 1), σ(K,T ) = σ¯ for some fixed strike K and maturity M . Then, the new model is written as
follows
xit =
n∑
j=1
aijx
j
t−1 + i(σ¯ − xit−1), (3)
or in matrix form
Xt = AXt−1 + E(σ¯1n −Xt−1), (4)
where E := diag(1, . . . , n). Then, we have the following result.
Theorem 3.1. Consider the opinion dynamics (4) and assume that i ∈ (0, aii), i = {1, . . . , n};
then, consensus to σ¯ is reached, i.e., limt→∞Xt = σ¯1n.
Proof. It is easy to verify that the solution Xt of the difference equation (4) is given by
Xt = (A− E)tX1 +
∑t−1
j=0
(A− E)jE σ¯1n, t > 1. (5)
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By Gershgorin circle theorem, the spectral radius ρ(A− E) < 1 for all i, i < aii. It follows that∑∞
j=0(A− E)jE σ¯1n = (In −A+ E)−1E σ¯1n, where In denoted the identity matrix of dimension n,
and limt→∞(A− E)t = 0, see [9]. The matrix A is row stochastic; then, (I −A)1n = 0n, where 0n
denotes the n× 1 vector composed of only zeros. Hence, we can write E1n = (In−A)1n + E1n; and
consequently 1n = (In −A+ E)−1E1n. It follows that
lim
t→∞Xt = limt→∞(A− E)
tX1 +
∑∞
j=0
(A− E)jE σ¯1n
= 0n + (In −A+ E)−1E1nσ¯ = 1nσ¯,
and the assertion follows.
Corollary 3.2. Consensus to σ¯ is reached exponentially with convergence rate ‖A − E‖∞, i.e.,
maxi{|xit − σ¯|} ≤ ‖A − E‖t−1∞ ‖X1 − σ¯1n‖∞, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where ‖·‖∞ denotes the matrix norm
induced by the vector infinity norm.
Proof. Define the error sequence Et−1 := (Xt−1 − σ¯1n) ∈ Rn. Then, from (4), the following is
satisfied:
Et = Xt − σ¯1n
= AXt−1 + E(σ¯1n −Xt−1)− σ¯1n
= A(Et−1 + σ¯1n) + E(σ¯1n − (Et−1 + σ¯1n))− σ¯1n
= (A− E)Et−1 + σ¯(A− In)1n
= (A− E)Et−1,
The last equality in the above expression follows from the fact that (A− In)1n = 0, because A is a
stochastic matrix. The solution Et of the above difference equation is given by Et = (A− E)t−1E1,
where E1 = X1 − σ¯1n denotes the initial error. Let ‖Et‖∞ = maxi(|eit|), i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, where
Et = (e
1
t , . . . , e
n
t )
T . Note that exponential convergence of ‖Et‖∞ implies exponential convergence of
Et itself. Using the solution Et = (A− E)t−1E1, the following can be written:
‖Et‖∞ = ‖(A− E)t−1E1‖∞
≤ ‖(A− E)‖t−1∞ ‖E1‖∞,
where ‖(A − E)‖∞ denotes the matrix norm of (A − E) induced by the vector infinity norm [9].
The inequality ‖Et‖∞ ≤ ‖(A − E)‖t−1∞ ‖E1‖∞ implies exponential convergence if ‖(A − E)‖∞ <
1. Because A = aij and E = diag(1, . . . , n), we can compute ‖(A − E)‖∞ as ‖(A − E)‖∞ =
maxi
(∑n
j=1,j 6=i |aij |+ |ai − i|
)
, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. The matrix A is stochastic, which implies aij ≥ 0
and
∑n
i=1 |aij | = 1; therefore, under the conditions of Theorem 3.1 (i.e., i ∈ (0, aii)), ‖(A−E)‖∞ =
maxi
(∑n
j=1,j 6=i |aij |+ |ai − i|
)
< 1 and hence exponential convergence of the consensus error Et
can be concluded with convergence rate given by ‖(A−E)‖∞ = maxi
(∑n
j=1,j 6=i |aij |+ |ai− i|
)
.
3.2 Consensus with an unknown leader
One criticism of model (4) is that feedback, even if it is not perfect, has to be learned. In practice,
there might not be a helpful mechanism that provides feedback. An alternative is to have an
unknown leader embedded in the set of traders. The agents are unsure who the leader is but by
taking averages of other traders, they all arrive at the opinion of the leader. In markov chain theory,
such behaviour is called an absorbing state. The leader guides the system to the true value. We
assume that the identity of the leader is unknown to all agents.
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Without loss of generality, we assume that the first agent (with corresponding opinion x1t ) is the
leader; it follows that x11 = σ¯, a1i = 0, i ∈ {2, · · · , n}, and a11 = 1. Then, in this configuration, the
opinion dynamics is given by
Xt = AXt−1, A =

1 0 . . . 0
a21 a22 . . . a2n
...
... . . .
...
an1 an2 . . . ann
 =:
1 0
∗ A˜
 , (6)
with aij ≥ 0,
∑n
j=1 aij = 1, aii > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and for at least one i,
∑n
j=2 aij < 1.
Theorem 3.3. Consider the opinion dynamics (6) and assume that the matrix A˜ is substochastic
and irreducible. It holds that limt→∞Xt = σ¯1n, i.e., consensus to σ¯ is reached.
Proof. Define the invertible matrix M ∈ Rn×n
M :=
(
1 0
1n−1 −In−1
)
.
Introduce the set of coordinates X˜t−1 := MXt−1. Note that x˜1t−1 = x1t−1, x˜2t−1 = x1t−1 −
x2t−1, . . . , x˜nt−1 = x1t−1 − xnt−1. Hence, if the error vector et−1 := (x˜2t−1, . . . , x˜nt−1)> = 0n−1, then
consensus to x1t = σ¯ is reached. Note that
MAM−1 =
1 ∗
0 A˜
 ,
where 0 denotes the zero vector of appropriate dimensions and A˜ as defined in (6). By construction,
X˜t−1 := MXt−1 → X˜t = MXt = MAXt−1 = MAM−1X˜t−1; hence, the consensus error et satisfies
the following difference equation
X˜t = MAM
−1X˜t−1 =
1 ∗
0 A˜
 X˜t−1 =⇒ et = A˜et−1, (7)
and the solution of et is then given by et = A˜
te1.
Because for at least one i,
∑n
j=2 aij < 1 and A˜ is substochastic and irreducible, the spectral
radius ρ(A˜) < 1, see Lemma 6.28 in [14]; it follows that limt→∞ A˜t = 0. Therefore, limt→∞ et = 0
and the assertion follows.
Corollary 3.4. Let ‖·‖∗ denote some matrix norm such that ‖A˜‖∗ < 1 (such a norm always
exists because ρ(A˜) < 1 under the conditions of Theorem 3.3). Then, consensus to σ¯ is reached
exponentially with the convergence rate given by ‖A˜‖∗, i.e. maxi{
∣∣xit − σ¯∣∣} ≤ C‖A˜‖t−1∗ ‖X1− σ¯1n‖∞,
for i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and some positive constant C ∈ R>0.
Proof. See Lemma 5.6.10 in [9] on how to construct such a ‖·‖∗. Now consider the consensus error et
defined in the proof of Theorem 3.3, which evolves according to the difference equation (7). It follows
that et = A˜
t−1e1, where e1 denotes the initial consensus error. Under the assumptions of Theorem
3.3, ρ(A˜) < 1. By Lemma 5.6.10 in [9], ρ(A˜) < 1 implies that there exists some matrix norm, say ‖·‖∗,
such that ‖A˜‖∗ < 1. We restate the error with norms and obtain ‖et‖∞ ≤ ‖A˜‖t−1∞ ‖e1‖∞. Because all
norms are equivalent in finite dimensional vector spaces (see Chapter 5 in [9]), ‖et‖∞ ≤ ‖A˜‖t−1∞ ‖e1‖∞
=⇒ ‖et‖∞ ≤ C‖A˜‖t−1∗ ‖e1‖∞ for some positive constant C ∈ R>0. As ‖A˜‖∗ < 1, the norm of the
consensus error ‖et‖∞ converges to zero exponentially with rate ‖A˜‖∗.
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4 Consensus (vectored agent dynamics)
In this section, we suppose that agents have beliefs over a range of strikes. Thus, each agent’s
opinion of the volatility curve is a vector with each entry corresponding to a particular strike.
Typically, in markets, options are quoted for at-the-money (atm) K = S0 and for two further strikes
left of and right of the atm level. Here, we examine the case of k strikes and n agents, i.e., each
agent i now has k quotes for k different moneyness levels. In this configuration, the true volatility
is σ¯ := [σ1, . . . , σk]
> ∈ Rk. See figure 1 (b).
4.1 Consensus with Feedback
Again, we assume that each agent takes a weighted average of other agents’ opinions and updates
its volatility estimate vector for the next period, i.e., at time t, the opinion xit ∈ Rk of the i-th agent
is given by
xit =
n∑
j=1
aijx
j
t−1 + i(σ¯ − xit−1), t ∈ N, (8)
where i ∈ (0, 1) denotes the learning coefficient of agent i, xjt−1 ∈ Rk is the opinion of agent j
at time (t − 1), and aij ≥ 0 denotes the opinion weights for the n investors with
∑n
j=1 aij = 1
and aii > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n. In this case, the stacked vector of opinions is Xt := (x1t , . . . , xnt )>,
Xt ∈ Rkn. The opinion dynamics of the n agents can then be written in matrix form as follows
Xt = (A⊗ Ik)Xt−1 + (E ⊗ Ik)(1n ⊗ σ¯ −Xt−1), (9)
where A = aij ∈ Rn×n is a row-stochastic matrix, E = diag(1, . . . , n), and ⊗ denotes Kronecker
product. We have the following result.
Theorem 4.1. Consider the opinion dynamics in (9) and assume that i ∈ (0, aii), i = {1, . . . , n};
then, consensus to 1n ⊗ σ¯ (with σ¯ = [σ1, . . . , σk]> ∈ Rk) is reached, i.e., limt→∞Xt = 1n ⊗ σ¯.
Proof. Define the error sequence et−1 := Xt−1− (1n⊗ σ¯). Note that et−1 = 0 implies that consensus
to (1n ⊗ σ¯) is reached. Given the opinion dynamics (9), the evolution of the error et−1 satisfies the
following difference equation
et = ((A− E)⊗ Ik)Xt−1 + ((E ⊗ Ik)− Ikn)(1n ⊗ σ¯)
= ((A− E)⊗ Ik)et−1 − (1n ⊗ σ¯) + (A⊗ Ik)(1n ⊗ σ¯)
= ((A− E)⊗ Ik)et−1 + ((A− In)1n ⊗ σ¯).
It is easy to verify that, because A is stochastic, (A − In)1n = 0n. Then, the error dynamics
simplifies to
et = ((A− E)⊗ Ik)et−1, (10)
and consequently, the solution et of (10) is given by et = ((A− E)⊗ Ik)te1. By properties of the
Kronecker product and Gershgorin’s circle theorem, the spectral radius ρ(A−E) < 1 for i ∈ (0, aii).
It follows that limt→∞((A − E) ⊗ Ik)t = 0, see [9]. Therefore, limt→∞ et = 0kn and the assertion
follows.
Corollary 4.2. Consensus to σ¯ is reached exponentially with the convergence rate given by ‖(A−
E)⊗ Ik)‖∞, i.e., ‖Xt − (1n ⊗ σ¯)‖∞ ≤ ‖(A− E)⊗ Ik)‖t−1∞ ‖X1 − (1n ⊗ σ¯)‖∞.
The proof of the above result is very similar to previous corollaries and is omitted.
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4.2 Consensus with an unknown leader
Similarly to the scalar case; here, we assume that there is a leader driving all the other agents
through the opinion matrix A. Again, without loss of generality, we assume that the first agent (with
corresponding opinion x1t ∈ Rk) is the leader, x11 = σ¯ = [σ1, . . . , σk]> ∈ Rk, a1i = 0, i ∈ {2, · · · , n},
and a11 = 1. Then, in this configuration, the opinion dynamics is given by
Xt = (A⊗ Ik)Xt−1, A =

1 0 . . . 0
a21 a22 . . . a2n
...
... . . .
...
an1 an2 . . . ann
 =:
(
1 0
∗ A˜
)
, (11)
with aij ≥ 0,
∑n
j=1 aij = 1, aii > 0 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and for at least one i,
∑n
j=2 aij < 1.
Theorem 4.3. Consider the opinion dynamics (11) and assume that the matrix A˜ is substochastic
and irreducible; then, consensus to 1n ⊗ σ¯ is reached, i.e., limt→∞Xt = 1n ⊗ σ¯.
The proof of Theorem 4.3 follows the same line as the proof of Theorem 3.3 and it is omitted
here.
Corollary 4.4. Let ‖·‖∗ denote some matrix norm such that ‖A˜‖∗ < 1, then consensus to σ¯ is
reached exponentially with convergence rate ‖A˜⊗ Ik‖∗, i.e. ‖Xt− (1n⊗ σ¯)‖∞ ≤ C‖A˜⊗ Ik‖t−1∗ ‖X1−
(1n ⊗ σ¯)‖∞, for some positive constant C ∈ R>0.
5 Numerical Simulations
Consider the opinion dynamics with feedback (4) with ten agents (i.e., n = 10), matrix A as defined in
the supplementary material, σ¯ = 0.375, and initial conditionX1 = (0.3, 0.35, 0.37, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.55, 0.57, 0.6, 0.65)
>.
Figure 2 depicts the obtained simulation results for different values of the learning parameters i,
i = 1, . . . , 10. Specifically, Figure 2(a) shows results without learning, i.e, i = 0 (here there is no
consensus to σ¯), Figure 2(b) depicts the results for i = 0.9aii. As stated in Theorem 3.1, consensus
to σ¯ is reached. Figure 2(c) shows results for i = 0.9aii + 0.94bi with b4 = 1 and bi = 0 otherwise,
i = 1, . . . , 10. Note that, in this case, the value of 4 violates the condition of Theorem 3.1 (i.e.,
4 /∈ (0, a44)) and, as expected, consensus is not reached. Next, consider the opinion dynamics with
leader (6) with n = 10 and initial condition
X1 = (σ¯, 0.35, 0.37, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.55, 0.57, 0.6, 0.65)
>.
For the leader case, the opinion weights matrix is constructed by replacing the first row of
A by (1, 0, . . . , 0). The corresponding matrix A˜ (defined in 6) is substochastic and irreducible,
and
∑i=10
i=2 aij < 1, j = 1, . . . , 10. Hence, all the conditions of Theorem 3.3 are satisfied and
consensus to σ¯ = 0.375 is expected. Figure 2(d) shows the corresponding simulation results.
Finally, Figure 3 shows the evolution of the vectored opinion dynamics (9) with n = 10 and k = 3
(i.e., ten three dimensional agents), matrix A as in the case with feedback, (vectored) volatility
σ¯ = (0.67, 0.22, 0.88)>, learning parameters i = 0.9aii for aii as in A, and initial condition 1k ⊗X1
with X1 as in the first experiment above.
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Figure 2: Evolution of the agents’ dynamics (4): (a) without learning, (b) with learning and i
satisfying the conditions of Theorem 3.1, (c) with learning and i not satisfying the conditions of
Theorem 3.1, and (d) Evolution of the agents’ dynamics with leader (6).
6 Arbitrage Bounds
We have taken the true volatility parameter as exogenous to our models. Our only requirement
is that there is no static arbitrage, by which we mean that all the quotes in volatility which
translate to option prices are such that one cannot trade in the different strikes to create a profit.
Checking whether a volatility surface is indeed arbitrage free is nontrivial, nevertheless some sufficient
conditions are well known [4]. As long as the volatility surface satisfies them our analysis implies
global stability towards an arbitrage free smile.
We parameterize the volatility function (assuming expiry T and S0 are fixed) and denote the
option price as
BS(K,σ(K)) , BS(S0,K, T, σ(K)).
Our attention is on varying K, to ensure no static arbitrage. We assume that the σ(K) translates
into unique call option dollar prices, which follows from the strictly positive first derivative of the
option price with respect to σ.
• Condition 1: (Call Spread) For 0 < K1 ≤ K2, we have BS(K1, σ(K1)) ≥ BS(K2, σ(K2)).
• Condition 2: (Butterfly Spread) For 0 < K1 < K2 < K3,
BS(K1, σ(K1)) +
K2−K1
K3−K2 ×BS(K3, σ(K3)) ≥
K3 −K1
K3 −K2 ×BS(K2, σ(K2)).
How these arbitrage-free curve volatility conditions are developed is not an easy task: see an
account by [13]. Delving into this topic would take us further into stochastic analysis and away
from the focus of this paper.
9
Figure 3: Evolution of the multidimensional agents’ dynamics with learning (9).
7 Connections and Conclusion
Recently, there has been some rather interesting work on the intersection of computer science and
option pricing. In [7] the authors showed how to use efficient online trading algorithms to price
the current value of financial instruments, deriving both upper and lower bounds using online
trading algorithms. Moreover, [2, 1] developed Black-Scholes price as sequential two-player zero-
sum game. Whilst these papers made an excellent start to bridge the gap between two different
academic communities - mainly mathematical finance and theoretical computer science - they do
not address the reality of volatility smiles and trading. Our contribution can be viewed as making
these connections more concrete. The smile itself is a conundrum and there have even been articles
questioning whether it can be solved [3]. The traditional way from the ground up is to develop a
stochastic process for the volatility and asset price, possibly introducing jumps or more diffusions
through uncertainty [10]. Such models have been successfully developed, but the time is ripe to
incorporate multi-agent models with arbitrage free curves.
Combining learning agents in stochastic differential equation models [15], such as the Black-
Scholes model, is an exciting proposition. Moreover, opinion dynamics as a subject on its own has
been studied quite extensively. Recent references that present an expansive discussion are [12, 11].
In this paper, we introduce models of learning agents in the context of option trading. A key
open question in this setting is how the market comes to a consensus about market volatility,
which is reflected in derivative pricing through the Black-Scholes formula. The framework we
have established allows us to explore other areas. Thus far, we took the smile as an exogenous
object, proving convergence to equilibrium beliefs. A natural step forward would be to look at the
beliefs as probability measures, where each measure corresponds to a different option pricing model.
Our learning models focus on interaction between agents. Actually, agents can be interpreted as
algorithms. Each algorithm corresponding to a particular belief of a pricing model.
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